Performance Analysis of Routing Protocols in MANET under Malicious Attacks by Gorine, Adam & Saleh, Rabia
This is a peer­reviewed, final published version of the following document, ©AirCC and is licensed under 
Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 license:
Gorine, Adam ORCID: 0000­0001­7378­8933 and Saleh, Rabia (2019) 
Performance Analysis of Routing Protocols in MANET under Malicious 
Attacks. International Journal of Network Security and Its Applications, 11 
(2). pp. 1­12. ISSN 0974­9330 
Official URL: http://aircconline.com/abstract/ijnsa/v11n2/11219ijnsa01.html
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5121/ijnsa.2019.11201
EPrint URI: http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/id/eprint/6504
Disclaimer 
The University of Gloucestershire has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title in the material 
deposited and as to their right to deposit such material.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation or warranties of commercial utility, title, or fitness 
for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in respect of any material deposited.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation that the use of the materials will not infringe any 
patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights.  
The University of Gloucestershire accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual property rights in any 
material deposited but will remove such material from public view pending investigation in the event of an 
allegation of any such infringement. 
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT.
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA) Vol. 11, No.2, March 2019
DOI: 10.5121/ijnsa.2019.11201                                                                  
PERFORMANCE 
PROTOCOLS 
1School of Business and Technology, Gloucestershire University, Cheltenham, England
ABSTRACT 
 
MANETs routing protocols are vulnerable to various 
hole and black-hole attacks.  These routing protocols are unprotected and subsequently result in various 
kinds of malicious mobile nodes being injected into the networks. In this paper, three types of a
as selfish, grey-hole and black-hole attacks have been applied to two important MANET routing protocols; 
Ad-hoc On demand Distance Vector (OADV) and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) in order to analyse and 
compare the impact of these attacks on the
packet loss and consumption of energy.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobile ad-hoc networks are composed of a number of wireless mobile devices called nodes as 
shown in figure 1. These networks have no fixed infrastructure and no central administration. 
MANETs are characterised by resource constraints, dynamic topology, and openness to wire
media. However, wireless networks have a number of vulnerabilities, which may be exploited by 
hackers to gain access to the network to steal or tamper with data [4, 11].
 
In this paper, the performance of two MANET’s routing protocols; Ad
Vector (AODV) and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) have been analysed under malicious attacks 
[10]. 
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2. RELATED WORK 
 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks routing protocols have been the subject of intense research in the past 
20 years. Many researchers have been studying the performance of a single protocol under 
several attacks, but attempts are carried out on performance analysis of routing protocols under 
malicious attacks. 
 
In [15], the authors evaluated the performance of AODV routing under black-hole, grey-hole, 
selfish and flooding attacks. Their finding is that black-hole and flooding attacks have a severe 
impact on the AODV performance compared to selfish and grey-hole attacks. 
 
In 2016, the authors [16], also focused on the impact of  the black hole, flooding and rushing 
attacks against AODV. They compared the performance of AODV under attacks with the original 
AODV in terms of Packet Delivery Ratio, Average End to End Delay and Average Throughput. 
They concluded that the performance of AODV degrades under the attacks. Their finding is that 
black hole attack has a higher significant effect on the network performance than flooding and 
rushing attacks. 
 
In [17], the authors conducted a comparative study between AODV and DSR routing protocols, 
but under wormhole attacks only. Their simulation results show that DSR performs better than 
AODV under wormhole attacks in MANET. They concluded that the high performance of DSR is 
due to the alternative data delivery path provided by DSR. 
 
However, in our research paper, a comparative study between AODV and DSR routing protocols 
subject to several attacks including back-hole, grey-hole and selfish node attacks. 
 
3. SECURITY GOALS 
 
The majority of previous security studies define five major security goals which are required for 
attacks' prevention [7]. 
 
Like all wireless networks, MANETs need is to achieve the security goals, such as 
confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability, and data freshness. 
 
3.1. DATA CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Routing and packet forwarding information must remain confidential. To keep the confidentiality, 
it is required to ensure to disclose data packets to authorized nodes only. Data encryption is a 
common method of ensuring confidentiality 
 
3.2. DATA AUTHENTICATION 
 
Authentication ensures that data packets or communications between nodes are accessible by only 
authorised nodes. Without authentication, a malicious node can masquerade as a trusted node in 
MANET and can have a negative impact on data transmission between nodes. 
 
3.3. DATA INTEGRITY 
 
Integrity ensures that data must not be changed in transit, and steps must be taken to ensure that 
data cannot be altered by unauthorized nodes. 
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For example, a malicious node may add some packets or modify data within a packet before 
forwarding the corrupt data to its neighbour. 
 
3.4. DATA AVAILABILITY 
 
Availability ensures that services provided by nodes should be available to their users even under 
attacks, such as energy starvation, denial of service and a misbehaving node. 
 
3.5. DATA FRESHNESS 
 
Even if confidentiality and data integrity have been achieved it is imperative to ensure that no old 
data have been replayed. This requirement of fresh data is important when dealing with shared-
keys which need to be changed over time. 
 
4. ROUTING PROTOCOLS IN MANET 
 
Protocols are defined as the set of rules which are used by network devices to communicate 
between them. Due to mobility nature of nodes of MANET and the dynamic network topology, 
an effective routing protocol is needed to manage the communication between the nodes within 
the network. 
 
Routing protocols in MANET’s routing protocols are divided into two groups; proactive and 
reactive routing protocols [1]. 
 
In this paper, the performance of two MANET’s routing protocols; Ad-hoc on demand Distance 
Vector (OADV) and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) have been analysed under normal operation 
 
4.1. AD-HOC ON DEMAND DISTANCE VECTOR ROUTING (AODV) 
 
Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) is a routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks 
(MANETs) and other wireless ad hoc networks with a large number of mobile nodes [14]. The 
protocol’s algorithm creates a route between two nodes only when the route is requested by the 
source node. This route will remain active as long as the source node has data packets to send to 
the destination node. However the route will be dropped as soon as the source stops sending data 
packets. 
 
AODV uses optimisation; this will reduce the overhead in the network. Optimisation in AODV, 
being the “time-to-live” field will limit propagation in route requests when they are sent. The 
time-to-live field can fluctuate if there is no route reply. 
 
4.2. DYNAMIC SOURCE ROUTING (DSR) 
 
DSR is a fully reactive routing protocol [17]. It is a source routing protocol meaning that a packet 
carried in the network contains an ordered list of all nodes through which the packet must be 
routed. 
 
The DSR protocol is composed of two mechanisms that work together to allow the discovery and 
maintenance of source routes in the ad hoc network as shown in figure 2: 
 
• Route Discovery is the mechanism by which a node S wishing to send a packet to a 
destination node D obtains a source route to D. Route Discovery is used only when S 
attempts to send a packet to D and does not already know a route to D. 
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• Route Maintenance is the mechanism by which node S is able to detect, while using a
 source route to D, if the network topology has changed such that it can no longer use its 
route to D because a link along the route no longer works. When Route Maintenance 
indicates a source route is broken, S can attempt to use any other route it happens to know to 
D, or can invoke Route Discovery again to find a new route. Route Maintenance is used only
when S is actually sending packets to D.
 
5. SECURITY THREATS 
 
Due to the lack of infrastructure and the dynamic nature of MANET, they are more likely to be 
open to attacks [2], which may disturb the relationship of trust between nodes. These MANETs' 
characteristics allow attackers to readily target the network and 
jamming and disturbing the communication between trusted nodes.
 
In mobile ad-hoc networks, attacks can be classified as active and passive attacks [3]. In passive 
attacks, attackers only listen to the traffic for information with
process, which compromises confidentiality such as snooping, eavesdropping, traffic analysis and 
monitoring. Whereas active attacks destroy, steal or modify useful information as well as 
damaging network operations, such a
routing attacks and selfish attacks.
 
In this paper, three types of attacks have been investigated; these are grey
attacks and selfish node attacks.
 
5.1. SELFISH NODES ATTACKS
 
A selfish node is a type of routing protocol attack at the Data link layer, in which a malicious 
node deviates from the original routing and forwarding of packets.
 
Due to the limitation of resources
resources by refusing to forward packets to other nodes [5]. There are two types of selfish nodes:
 
• The first type shares the routing table
destinations. 
• The second type do not share their 
routing protocol, a selfish node may decide to drop all RREQ packets received or not forwarding 
a route reply RREP packet to its destination.
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5.2. BLACK HOLE ATTACKS
 
Black-hole attacks happen at the Ne
nodes that it has the shortest route to their destination node. The malicious node will drop all data 
packets or implement man-in
number (3) sends fake routing information by advertising that it has the shortest path to the 
destination node (4). When the node (1) wants to send a packet data to the node (4), it will initiate 
route discovery. The malicious node (3) intercepts the RREQ pa
the sender node (1). If the reply from the malicious node (3) reaches the source first, then the 
sender node (1) disregards all other RREP messages and start sending packets through node (3). 
Therefore, all packets are lost o
 
5.3. GREY HOLE ATTACKS
 
The grey-hole attack takes place at the network layer and can be used as a slow poison in the 
network side [12]. 
 
A grey-hole attack happens when a 
destination node with the intention of intercepting data packet. However instead of forwarding the 
data packet, the malicious node (i.e. the grey
three ways: 
 
• Drops packets sent by specific nodes while forwarding packets sent by the other nodes.
• The malicious node drops all packets received within a specific period of time and forward 
packets later. 
• The grey-hole drops the intercepted packets randomly and 
• The grey-hole attack is more difficult to detect than the black hole attack in which the 
malicious node drops all the packets received.
 
6. METHODOLOGY 
 
Three types of research methods are used for evaluating the performance of wireless
physical measurement, analytical methods and network simulation.
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Figure 3. Black hole attack 
 
 
malicious node advertises itself as having a valid route to the 
-hole) may exhibit its malicious behaviour in one of 
forward other packets.
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 networks: 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA) Vol. 11, No.2, March 2019 
6 
 
In this research paper, a network simulator called ns2 is selected as it is currently the best-known 
network simulation package for research into wireless networks [8,13]. ns-2 is written in C++, 
which uses MIT’s Object Tool Command Language (OTcl) as the command and configuration 
interface. 
 
The simulator is invoked via the ns interpreter and the OTcl scripts defined the simulation rules. 
ns-2 provides substantial support for the simulation of TCP/ UDP, routing, multicast protocols 
over both wired and wireless, local and satellite network. 
 
Currently ns-2 development is supported by the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA). 
 
7. IMPLEMENTATION 
 
In this research paper, NS2 (v2.34) is used as the network simulator [9] and was run under 
Ubuntu v14.04 operating system. 
 
The network consists of 50 wireless nodes spread randomly in a terrain area of 700m x 1000m 
with simulated waypoint mobility model time of 100, 300, 500, 700 and 900 seconds. The 
simulation used the random, which has become a "benchmark" model for evaluating the routing 
protocols of MANET. 
 
The aim of the simulation is to evaluate the network performance by measuring the following 
parameters: throughput, average delay, packet loss and energy per byte. 
 
These parameters are defined as follow: 
 
• Throughput: The total number of packets successfully received by the destination node. 
• Packet Loss: The number of packets dropped during the simulation. 
• Average delay: The average time taken by data packets to travel between the source and 
destination nodes. 
• Energy per byte: The amount of energy consumed by nodes to transmit and receive the 
number of data packets. 
 
In this experiment, the performance of two protocols namely; Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
and Ad-Hoc on Demand Distance Vector (AODV) are evaluated in two separate scenarios. The 
first one when the network is operating under normal conditions (i.e. without attacks or malicious 
nodes) and the second scenario, the network is operating under attacks (i.e. with some malicious 
nodes). The simulation is repeated ten times split equally between AODV and DSR protocols 
with different time scale (100, 300, 500, 700 and 900). 
 
8. RESULTS OF SIMULATION OF MANET UNDER ATTACKS 
 
In this part of the experiment, the network is simulated under attack by several malicious nodes 
including black-hole attack, selfish node attack and grey-hole attack under both AODV and DSR 
protocols. 
 
The selfish nodes are implemented to drop just route request and route reply, because if a node is 
not involved in route discovery, it will not be used in forwarding data packets. However, black 
hole nodes are implemented to drop data packets, forward routing requests and reply packets, 
because the attack affect routing operation. By contrast, the grey-hole attack is similar to the 
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black hole attack with inconsistent behaviour, as it will drop selective data packets and forward 
others. 
 
8.1. SELFISH NODES ATTACKS 
 
 THROUGHPUT OF THE PRO
 
In Figure 4 the graph shows the throughput in the protocols with selfish nodes, in which their 
percentages vary from 10% to 50%. It is clear that AODV is much better than DSR to deliver 
packets successfully in this kind of attack.
 
Figure 4. Throughput of 
 AVERAGE DELAY OF THE PROTOCOL
 
As can be seen from Figure 5, average delay of DSR is higher than AODV. Because DSR is an 
On-Demand source routing protocol, this can be considered as the major reason fo
route is discovered only when needed and also, the mechanism for route discovery happens each 
time as well as, several paths to the destination is di
delay. On the other hand, AODV has just one path for 
is updated permanently based on a sequence number. Thus, that leads to a slight end to end delay. 
Also, AODV was not impacted very much with increase in the percentage of selfish nodes, unlike 
DSR, which was impacted when selfish nodes increased
 
Figure 5. Average delay of the protocols with selfish nodes
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 PACKET LOSS OF THE PR
 
From line graph in Figure 6, it is obvious that
despite DSR being better in normal protocols. While AODV as a standard protocol does not have 
better performance than DSR, in the case of selfish nodes it is better in performance than DSR.
 
Figure 6. 
 ENERGY PER BYTE OF TH
 
Figure 7 illustrates the energy per byte which is consumed during participation in routing 
activities under different percentages of selfish nodes. It is 
even when the percentage of selfish nodes reached 40%, while DSR was affected by the attack 
and consequently, it consumed high amounts of energy when the attacks increased. Thus, AOD 
outperforms DSR in terms of consuming
 
Figure 7. Energy per byte of the protocols with selfish nodes
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8.2 BLACK HOLE ATTACKS 
 
 THROUGHPUT OF THE PRO
 
Figure 8 illustrates throughput of both protocols under different percentages of black hole 
and it is clear that both protocols are affected by increasing the percentage of the black hole 
attack. However, it is obvious that DSR outperforms AODV when the percentage of attack nodes 
has increased. This performance can be justified because of 
AODV networks and their different techniques to achieve routing activities, such as the packet 
salvage of the DSR protocol in NS2.
 
Figure 8. Throughput of the protocols with black hole attack
 AVERAGE DELAY OF THE 
 
In Figure 9, the line graph shows the average delay of both protocols under black hole nodes. 
Both protocols have approximately the same nature in terms of performance when assessing the 
average delay metric as the average delay fluctuated over the time of the simulation. However, 
AODV suffered less delay than DSR in all the percentages of attacks, for the reasons discussed in 
the previous section. 
 
Figure 9. Average delay of the protocols with black hole attack
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 PACKET LOSS OF THE PR
 
From Figure 10 below, it can be observed that packet loss for both protocols under black hole 
nodes increases when the percentage of the attack is increased. Also, as discussed earlier in the 
simulation of the normal protocols section, the DSR protocol has better performance than the 
AODV protocol for the same reasons discussed in the normal protocol.
 
Figure 10. Packet loss of the protocols with black hole attack
 
 ENERGY PER BYTE OF TH
 
Figure 11 below shows the energy consumption of the protocols under different percentages of 
black hole attack. It is clear that DSR shows better performance than AODV, which increased 
slightly when the black hole nodes increased 
very much greater impact on AODV, which increased from 0.11 when the percentage of black 
hole nodes was 10% to 0.68 when the attack increased to 50%.
 
Figure 11. Energy per byte of the protocols with 
8.3. GREY HOLE ATTACKS
 
Grey-hole attack has the same impact as black hole attack on throughput, average delay and 
energy consumption. However, it has a different effect on dropping packets in the protocols, for 
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the reason that it is designed to drop fewer packets than the black hole because of its fluctuation 
in behaviour. Consequently, at instance T1, a grey
T2 it becomes a malicious node.
 
 DROPPED PACKETS IN TH
 
As can be seen from the below graph in Figure 12, packet loss is higher in AODV than in DSR. 
The reason behind this is related to the same discussion as given above regarding selfish and 
black hole attacks. 
 
Figure 12. Packet loss of the protoco
9. CONCLUSION 
 
Security is an important issue in MANET as hackers are finding new ways to intercept data 
during their exchange between wireless nodes in order to steal or tamper
 
In this research paper, the performance of 
by measuring several parameters under different attacks by introducing some malicious nodes 
within the network. 
 
Based on the simulation results, DSR was affected more by selfish nodes than AODV. However, 
DSR performed better than AODV under black hole attack. In terms of average delay, under 
selfish nodes and under black hole attack, AODV has better performance than DSR, which has 
high average delay in all scenarios.
 
AODV performed better than DSR under sel
performed better than AODV.
 
In the case of energy per byte and under selfish nodes, DSR consumed less energy than AODV. 
However, under black hole attack, DSR consumed more energy than AODV.
 
In summary, both DSR and AODV protocols have been affected by the attacks and their 
performance decreased in all terms (i.e end
throughput). Therefore, such attacks need to be detected and prevented in MANETs.
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